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CAN STATE "MEDICAL" MARIJUANA STATUTES SURVIVE 
THE SOVEREIGN'S FEDERAL DRUG lAWS? 
A TOKE TOO FAR 
M. Wesley Clark, JD, LL.M.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article explores whether, and to what extent, federal authori-
ties can enforce the federal Controlled Substances Act [CSA] 1 against 
state and local governments acting under color of a conflicting state 
or local law. The question is both important and timely, inasmuch as 
state and local jurisdictions have been enacting legislation in conflict 
with the CSA to permit personal use amounts of drugs (particularly 
marijuana) for professed pain-relief, other medical needs, and most 
importantly, because of the Supreme Court's June 2005 six to three 
decision in Gonzales v. Raich.2 
II. OVERVIEW 
The clear import of federal law supports the view that the CSA, as 
well as implementing regulations, trump, preempt, and are "supreme" 
to contrary state and local laws.3 As an initial observation, note that 
Chief Justice Marshall remarked in Gibbons v. Ogden: 
[that as] to such acts of the State Legislatures as do not tran-
scend their powers, but ... interfere with, or are contrary to 
the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution, 
... [i]n every such case, the act of Congress ... is supreme; 
* Mr. Clark is a Senior Attorney with the Office of Chief Counsel, Drug 
Enforcement Administration [DEA]. The views expressed herein are his 
and do not reflect the views of the DEA Office of Chief Counsel, DEA, or 
the Department of Justice. 
1. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, Title II (i.e., §§ 100-709), 84 Stat. 1236 (1970). Title II of the Act is 
denominated the Controlled Substances Act. Although the bulk of the CSA is 
codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904, a relatively small number of its provisions 
are scattered elsewhere within the U.S. Code. 
2. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005); see also infra note 37. 
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 2, provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]his Constitu-
tion, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." See also Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. 
Supp.2d 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2001) ("Even though state law may allow for the 
prescription or recommendation of medicinal marijuana within its borders, 
to do so is still a violation of federal law under the CSA."). 
1 
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and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of 
powers not controverted, must yield to it.4 
As one constitutional law scholar, Professor Lawrence Tribe, said, 
"[u]nder the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, state action must give 
way to federal legislation where a valid 'act of Congress fairly inter-
preted is in actual conflict with the law of the State.'''5 That scholar 
further observed that 
[t]he Supreme Court typically divides preemption analysis 
into three categories ... (1) "express preemption," where 
Congress has in so many words declared its intention to pre-
clude state regulation of a described sort in a given area; (2) 
"implied preemption," where Congress, through the struc-
ture or objectives of its enactments, has by implication pre-
cluded a certain kind of state regulation in the area; and (3) 
"conflict preemption," where Congress did not necessarily 
focus on preemption of state regulation at all, but where the 
particular state law conflicts directly with federal law, or oth-
erwise stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal 
statutory objectives.6 
4. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824). See also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1173 (3d ed. 2000) (quoting Ogden, 22 U.S (9 
Wheat.) at 211); Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 384 (1963) 
('" [T] he law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not 
controverted, must yield' when incompatible with federal legislation." 
(quoting Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 211). 
5. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1179 (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 
(1912) (dictum)). Continuing, Professor Tribe asserted: "[r]egulations 
duly promulgated by a federal agency, pursuant to a valid congressional 
delegation, have the same preemptive effect." Id. (paraphrasing holding 
reiterated in Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 
U.S. 707, 713 (1985)). 
6. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1176-77. See also English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 
72, 78-79 (1990). 
[S] tate law is pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause ... in three 
circumstances. First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to 
which its enactments pre-empt state law .... Second, in the absence 
of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regu-
lates conduct in a field that Congress intended the federal govern-
ment to occupy exclusively. Such an intent may be inferred from a 
"scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasona-
ble the inference that Congress left no room for the States to sup-
plement it," or where an Act of Congress "touch[es] a field in 
which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system 
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same 
subject." ... Finally, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it 
actually conflicts with federal law. Thus, the Court has found pre-
emption where it is impossible for a private party to comply with 
both state and federal requirements . .. or where state law stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphases supplied). 
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Observe that in instances where Congress has chosen not to, or 
failed to, address preemption within a federal statute's confines, the 
Supreme Court will look to "whether challenged state action . . . 
'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress."'7 Professor Tribe adds that 
a state action may be struck down as an invalid interference 
with the federal design either because it is in substantive con-
flict with the operation of a federal regulation or program 
... or because, whatever its substantive impact, it intrudes 
jurisdictionally upon a field that Congress has validly reserved 
for exclusively federal regulation .... 8 
Other commentators have similarly concluded that "[b]eginning 
with Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in M'Culloch v. State of Maryland,9 
the Supreme Court has implied a responsibility for invalidating state 
laws which appear to conflict with federal law or policy."IO Two issues, 
the second of which touches on the matter before us, were paramount 
in M'Culloch; namely, whether the United States could establish a na-
tional bank even though the Constitution does not specifically enu-
merate the power to create one, and whether a branch of the national 
bank located in Maryland could properly be taxed by the state. II M-
ter concluding that Congress could properly enact all laws which are 
"necessary and proper," although not specifically enumerated, to ful-
fill its constitutionally assigned responsibilities, Chief Justice Marshall 
next turned to the state taxation question, noting that "a power to 
create implies a power to preserve" from whence it follows that "a 
power to destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and in-
7. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1176 (quoting, in part, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 
52,67 (1941) (holding that the federal Alien Registration Act preempted a 
Pennsylvania state alien registration act because the federal scheme was 
comprehensive, and "the supremacy of the national power in the general 
field of foreign affairs, including power over immigration, naturalization 
and deportation, is made clear by the Constitution")). The Hines Court 
went on to say that: 
in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or 
federal laws touching the same subject, [we have] made use of the 
following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; 
repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency, violation; 
curtailment; and interference. But none of these expressions pro-
vides an infallible constitutional test or exclusive constitutional 
yardstick. 
Id. Further, "[i]n principle, a United States treaty or international agree-
ment may also be said to occupy a field and preempt a subject, and super-
sede State law or policy even though that law or policy is not necessarily in 
conflict with the international agreement .... " RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 cmt. e (1987). 
8. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1177 (emphasis added). 
9. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
10. 3 Chester James Antieau & William J. Rice, Modern Constitutional Law 33 
(2d ed. 1997) (emphases added). 
11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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compatible with these powers to create and to preserve."12 The Chief 
Justice also said that "where this repugnancy exists, that authority 
which is supreme must control, not yield to that over which it is su-
preme."13 Continuing in this vein, the Chief Justice added that 
no principle ... can be admissible, which would defeat the 
legitimate operations of a supreme government. It is the 
very essence of supremacy, to remove all obstacles to its ac-
tion within its own sphere, and so to modifY every power 
vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its own op-
erations from their own influence. 14 
Maryland acknowledged that states may not "directly resist" the na-
tional bank, but argued that it was only seeking to exercise its "ac-
knowledged powers [of taxation] upon it."15 The Chief Justice easily 
disposed of this contention, commenting that whereas the citizens of 
Maryland could empower their state government with the authority to 
levy taxes upon that over which it had jurisdiction, only the people of 
the whole United States could confer the power to tax a national 
entity: 
[t]he sovereignty of a State extends to every thing which ex-
ists by its own authority, or is introduced by its permission; 
but ... it [does not] extend to those means which are em-
ployed by Congress to carry into execution powers conferred 
on that body by the people of the United States[.] ... 
Those powers are not given by the people of a single State. 
They are given by the people of the United States, to a gov-
ernment whose laws, made in pursuance of the constitution, 
are declared to be supreme. Consequently, the people of a 
single state cannot confer a sovereignty which will extend 
over them. 16 
The result is that 
[w] e are relieved, as we ought to be, from clashing sover-
eignty; from interfering powers; from repugnancy between a 
right in one government to pull down, what there is an ac-
12. Id. at 426. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 427. Professor Tribe contends that areas of the law where it is clear 
that Congress is constitutionally preeminent over the states are areas where 
"Congress has complete authority to define the distribution of federal and 
state regulatory power over what is conceded to be interstate commerce 
.... suppression of sedition, debtors' rights in federal bankruptcy, and 
patent and copyright regulation." TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1173-74. He con-
cludes that "[s]o long as Congress acts within an area delegated to it, the 
preemption of conflicting state or local action ... flow[s] directly from the 
substantive source of whatever power Congress is exercising, coupled with 
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI .... " TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1172. 
15. M'Culloch, 17 u.S. (4 Wheat.) at 427-28. 
16. Id. at 429. 
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knowledged right in another to build up; from the incompat-
ibility of a right in one government to destroy, what there is a 
right in another to preserve. 17 
Further, the Court reasoned that 
[t]he attempt to use it [the state's power of taxation] on the 
means employed by the government of the Union [the na-
tional bank], in pursuance of the constitution, is itself an 
abuse, because it is the usurpation of a power which the peo-
ple of a single state cannot give. IS 
[T]he states have no power ... to retard, impede, burden, or 
in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional 
laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers 
vested in the general government. I9 
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
A. Preemption: Conflicting, Supplemental and Occupying the Field 
5 
Normally, the first task to be addressed would be to discern the sce-
nario with which we are faced: are state "medical" marijuana laws, 
such as California's Proposition 215,20 in conflict with the CSA, do 
they supplement it, or do they encroach upon a federally occupied fiel{[? 
In this case, Congress has provided us with a rather straightforward 
answer by apparently combining more than one category, particularly 
the first and the third, and providing us with a hybrid, as section 903 
of Title 21 of the United States Code provides that 
[n]o provision of this subchapter [21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904] 
shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the 
Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, 
including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State 
law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be 
within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive 
conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that 
State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together. 21 
17. Id. at 430. 
18. Id. (emphasis added). 
19. Id. at 436. 
20. Proposition 215 was codified as the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFElY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2005). 
21. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2001). This provision was originally enacted as the Con-
trolled Substances Act, Title II, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 708, 84 Stat. 1236 
(1970). The legislative history for H.R. 18583, 91st Congo (1976), the bill 
which became law, does not shed much additio~allight on section 708. See 
H.R. REp. No. 91-1444, at 60 (1970), reprtnted m 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 
4629. The legislative history simply states that" [t] his section provides that 
title II of the bill [the Controlled Substances Act] is not intended to occupy 
the field (including criminal penalties) to the exclusion of any otherwise 
valid State law unless there is a direct and positive conflict between the 
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Put differently, where a "positive conflict" exists between the CSA and 
state law such that "the two cannot consistently stand together," the 
CSA "shall be construed" as evidencing Congressional intent to "oc-
cup[y] the field" in which the CSA provision operates "to the exclu-
sion of any State law on the same subject matter which would 
otherwise be within the authority of the State .... "22 There can be no 
more obvious example of statutes in conflict than where one statute 
prohibits what the other statute affirmativelf3 professes to permit; 
where two laws "cannot consistently stand together." The purpose of 
section 903, it is submitted, was not to restate the constitutional doc-
trine of federal preemption, but to make clear that Congress did not 
intend to be the sole occupant of the controlled substance field so 
long as state regimes on the subject were merely concurrent24 with, 
latter and a provision of this title, so that the two cannot consistently stand 
together." H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, at 60, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 4566, 
4629. 
22. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2000). 
23. As opposed to mere silence on the subject. 
24. See, e.g., People v. Sheppard, 432 N'y.S.2d 467,468 (1980) ("Although the 
Drug Enforcement Administration is a federal agency, concurren t jurisdic-
tion with the State is intended under 21 U.S.C.A., section 903."); Hartford 
v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 1339, 1341 (Conn. 1993) ("[T]he antipreemption pro-
vision of the Controlled Substances Act, evidences the fact that Congress 
specifically considered the issue of concurrent state proceedings and de-
cided to allow them."). Furthermore, in United States v. Lanza, the Supreme 
Court considered the propriety of prohibition-related liquor charges 
brought against defendants by both the United States and the state of 
Washington. 260 U.S. 377, 378-79 (1922). In Lanza, there was no question 
that the state of Washington and the federal government had concurrent 
jurisdiction. Id. at 381. Indeed, with respect to prohibition, the Eighteenth 
Amendment commanded concurrent jurisdiction. See U.S. CONST. amend. 
XVIII, § 2. Yet, according to the Lanza Court, the existence of concurrent 
power "does not enable Congress or the several states to defeat or thwart 
the prohibition, but only to enforce it by appropriate means." 260 U.S. at 
380 (quoting the National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 387 (1920)). 
The Lanza Court continued in this vein, finding that "[e]ach may, without 
interference by the other, enact laws to secure prohibition, with the limita-
tion that no legislation can give validity to acts prohibited by the amendment." 
Id. at 382 (emphases supplied). Moreover, in Stubblefield v. Ashcroft, which 
involved an Oregon "medical" marijuana statute similar to California's Pro-
position 215, the plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction, whereupon the 
United States filed a motion to dismiss. See The Findings and Recommen-
dations for Stubblefield v. Ashcroft, No. 03-6004-TC, available at https:/ / 
ecf.ord.uscourts.gov/ (D. Or. filed Mar. 24, 2003). The Magistrate Judge 
recommended that the Government's motion be granted because the Ore-
gon statute was in "direct conflict" with the CSA and therefore, the state 
statute could not stand: "[i]t [was] the state law which must give." Id. at 6, 
13. Further, the Oregon law "clearly [could not] be seen as directly al-
lowing a viable challenge to federal enforcement of the CSA." Id. at 6-7. If 
the Oregon statute stayed in force, it could arguably be "seen as an attempt 
to alter federal law (i.e., the CSA), it fails as a conflicting statute which is 
prohibited by not only the Supremacy Clause but by the very terms of 
§ 903." Id. at 8. 
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and not inconsistent with, the federal scheme as enunciated by the 
CSA. 
It is key to keep in mind that Congress, when it was considering the 
CSA, believed that the Act and already existing state controlled sub-
stance laws were "mutually supporting."25 It is submitted that to the 
extent that a state law ceases to be mutually supporting, a "positive 
conflict" exists and the two regimes can no longer "consistently stand 
together." The intent or function of the CSA at this point, therefore, 
would then be to occupy the field and trump or preempt the non-
supporting state law.26 It would seem, then, that the CSA establishes a 
standard, a threshold of control over drug-related behavior which 
contemplates overlapping regulation by the States, but only to the ex-
tent that these fifty sovereigns are not more permissive.27 
25. Included within House Report 1444 were recommendations of two commis-
sions established by successive Presidents and the actions taken in response 
to those recommendations. H.R. REp. No. 91-1444, at 16, reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.CA.N. 4566, 4581-582. The President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and the Administration of Justice was established in 1966 by 
President Lyndon Johnson and chaired by Nicholas deB. Katzenbach. Id., 
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N at 4582. The Commission prepared a report entitled The 
Challenge of a Free Society, which addressed the growing concerns of both 
drug trafficking and drug abuse in the United States. 91st Cong., The Chal-
lenge of Crime in a Free Society, ch. 8 (1967). The report outlined eight recom-
mendations to help improve the drug problem facing the nation, which the 
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, author of House Re-
port 1444, addressed. Id. at 216, 220-21, 223, 225, 231. "With the enact-
ment of this bill [the CSA], virtually all of these recommendations of the 
... Katzenbach Commission will have been implemented in whole or in 
part through legislation, reorganization plans, or administrative action 
.... " H.R. REp. No. 91-1444, at 16, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 4566, 
4582. One of the Katzenbach Commission's recommendations was that 
"[t]hose States which do not already have adequate legislation should 
adopt a model State drug abuse control act similar to the Federal Drug 
Abuse Control Amendments of 1965." Id. at 22, 1970 U.S.C.CAN. at 4588. 
The Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee responded, noting that 
"[a] Model State Drug Abuse Act has been developed and recommended to 
the States. Revisions will, of course, be necessary to conform that model to 
this act, since the reported bill and State laws are designed to be mutually support-
ing." [d. (emphasis added). 
26. H.R. REp. No. 91-1444, at 1, 22, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 4566, 4566, 
4567, 4588. 
27. Compare with the federal-state electronic surveillance scheme enunciated 
by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 
Pub. L. No. 90-351, Title III, 82 Stat. 197,211 (1968). States need not pass 
any electronic surveillance scheme statutes, but if they do, the legal regime 
constructed is allowable only if it is at least as restrictive as Title III. S. REp. 
No. 90-1097, at 98 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.CAN. 2122, 2187. The 
legislative history of Title III provides that "[t]he State statute must meet 
the minimum standards reflected as a whole in the proposed chapter [i.e., 
18 U.S.C. ch. 119 (2000)]. The proposed provision [18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2) 
(2000)] envisions that States would be free to adopt more restrictive legisla-
tion, or no legislation at all, but not less restrictive legislation." S. REp. No. 
90-1097, at 98, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.CAN. 2112, 2187. Referring to Title 
III, the Senate Report also said that "[t]he need for comprehensive, fair 
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It is clear that Congress views any state drug legalization attempts to 
be in conflict with and preempted by the CSA.28 Seven years ago, al-
most three decades after enactment of the CSA, Congress expressed 
its view in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act that: 
(3) pursuant to section 401 of the Controlled Substances 
Act, it is illegal to manufacture, distribute, or dispense mari-
juana ... ; (5) marijuana ... [has] not been approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration to treat any disease or condi-
tion; (6) the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act already 
prohibits the sale of any unapproved drug, including mari-
juana ... ; (11) Congress continues to support the existing 
federal legal process for determining the safety and efficacy 
of drugs and opposes efforts to circumvent this process by 
legalizing marijuana ... for medicinal use without valid sci-
entific evidence and the approval of the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration .... 29 
Elsewhere in the aforementioned Act, Congress again expressed its 
"sense," specifically "finding:" 
(5) Efforts to legalize or otherwise legitimize drug use pre-
sent a message to the youth of the United States that drug 
use is acceptable. . . . (7) The courts of the United States 
have repeatedly found that any State law that conflicts with a 
federal law or treaty is preempted by such law or treaty. (8) 
The Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.) strictly 
regulates the use and possession of drugs. (9) The United 
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances30 ••• similarly regulates the use 
and possession of drugs. (10) Any attempt to authorize 
under State law an activity prohibited under such Treaty or 
and effective reform setting uniform standards is obvious ... [gl uidance 
and supervision must be given to State and federal law enforcement of-
ficers. This can only be accomplished through national legislation." S. 
REP. No. 90-1097, at 69, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.CAN. 2122, 2156. See also 
infra pp. 32-34. 
28. See Cathryn L. Blaine, Note, Supreme Court 'lust Says No" To Medical Mari-
juana: A Look at United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 39 
Hous. L. REv. 1195, 1218-219 (2002) ("Except for use in an approved re-
search project, § 841 of the CSA prohibits the distribution of marijuana. 
The CSA does not exempt the distribution of marijuana to seriously ill per-
sons for their personal medical use. Therefore, based on the Supremacy 
Clause, the CSA preempts any State Law."). 
29. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 
Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. F, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-760 through 2681-76l. 
Importantly, Division F of the statute is entitled "Not Legalizing Marijuana for 
Medicinal Use. " Id. at 2681-760. 
30. Dec. 20, 1988, S. TREAlY Doc. No. 101-4 (1989). 
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the Controlled Substances Act would conflict with that 
Treaty or Act.3l 
9 
Congress further expressed its "sense" that "the several States, and the 
citizens of such States, should reject the legalization of drugs through 
legislation, ballot proposition, constitutional amendment, or any 
other means .... "32 
B. Constitutionality 
1. Statute Properly Founded Upon Commerce Clause33 Power 
It is black letter law that the Constitution, a document of enumer-
ated powers, is deliberately structured so that all powers reside in the 
people.34 Certain powers, however, have been specifically bestowed 
by the people upon the three branches of the federal government or 
have otherwise been left to reside with the states.35 Initial inquiry 
31. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 
Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. F, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-759. 
32. [d. at 2681-758. Notably, subtitle B is named Rejection of Legalization of Drugs. 
[d. Congress' continuing and clear opposition to the legalization of mari-
juana was again expressed as recently as 2003 in the Consolidated Appro-
priations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 108-7, Div. c., Title III, § 126, 117 Stat. 
107, 126 (2003), which provides: 
(a) None of the funds contained in this Act may be used to enact 
or carry out any law, rule, or regulation to legalize or otherwise 
reduce penalties associated with the possession, use, or distribution 
of any schedule I substance under the Controlled Substances Act 
(21 U.S.C. 802) or any tetrahydrocannabinols derivative. 
(b) The Legalization of Marijuana for Medical Treatment Initiative 
of 1998, also known as Initiative 59, approved by the electors of the 
District of Columbia on November 3, 1998, shall not take effect. 
The Resolution further imparts: "[n]one of the funds made available in this 
Act may be used for any activity that promotes the legalization of any drug 
or other substance included in schedule I of the schedules of controlled 
substances established by section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 
U.S.C.812)." [d. at § 511(a). For further discussion ofInitiative 59 as well 
as the legislation and litigation surrounding it, see Marijuana Policy Project 
v. D.C. Bd. of Elections and Ethics, 191 F. Supp.2d 196, 199 (D.D.C. 2002), 
rev'd, 46 F. App'x 633, 634, 2002 WL 31098381 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
33. "The Congress shall have Power To ... regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
34. See 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 3 (1998). 
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
The purpose of the division of powers between the federal and 
state governments pursuant to the Tenth Amendment is to protect 
the liberty of individual citizens from excessive concentration of 
power in a central government. By the terms of the Constitution, 
certain powers are entrusted to the federal government alone, 
while others are reserved to the states, and still others may be exer-
cised by both the federal and state governments. 
16A AM. JUR. 20 Constitutional Law § 222 (1998). 
"The United States Constitution contains an enumeration of powers 
expressly granted by the people to the federal government." [d. at § 223. 
"Because the federal powers derive from such a grant from the people, it is 
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must resolve whether the CSA is Constitutional; specifically, does the 
act stem from one or more of the enumerated powers the people have 
bestowed upon Congress?36 The answer is clear: yes. The weight of 
case law in this area is overwhelming.37 As but one example, in United 
States v. Visman,38 a California marijuana grower creatively appealed 
his federal controlled substance conviction claiming, in part, that 
"there is no reasonable basis to assume that plants rooted in the soil 
affect interstate commerce," and that "Congress does not have the au-
thority to regulate intrastate illegal conduct that affects interstate com-
merce."39 The Ninth Circuit easily disposed of the appellant'S 
arguments by noting that Congress, anticipating arguments such as 
Visman's, set forth "findings and declarations"40 at the CSA's outset 
which made it clear that there is an inextricable "nexus between mari-
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
axiomatic that the United States is a government of limited, enumerated, 
and delegated powers .... " Id. In other words, the federal Constitution is 
an enabling, and not a restraining, instrument. Id. Further: "It has been 
said that in the peculiar dual form of government in the United States, 
each state has the right to order its own affairs and govern its own people 
except so far as the federal Constitution expressly or by fair implication has 
withdrawn that power." Id. at § 226. 
Yet, "[wlhile the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a tru-
ism and a tautology, it is not without significance, since it expressly declares 
the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion 
that impairs the states' integrity or their ability to function in a federal sys-
tem." Id. See also Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., 536 U.S. 424, 
431 (2002) (holding that "pre-emption proscriptions" in a federal transpor-
tation statute did "not bar a state from delegating, to municipalities and 
other local units, state's authority to establish safety regulations governing 
motor carriers of property, including tow trucks"). 
"Thus, Congress cannot, under the pretext of executing delegated power, 
pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the federal 
government." 16A AM. JUR. 2n at § 235. 
See, e.g., Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp.2d 113, 122 (D.D.C. 2001) (de-
nying an application for a preliminary injunction enjoining federal officials 
from initiating civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings against those 
involved in the medicinal use of marijuana pursuant to state laws). See also 
21 U.S.C.A. § 801, 118 n.1 (2000) (Note on Constitutionality). The Su-
preme Court, however, did not rule directly on the matter until June 2005, 
when it decided Gonzales v. Haich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). For example, in 
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., the Court declared: "[nlor 
are we passing today on a constitutional question, such as whether the Con-
trolled Substances Act exceeds Congress' power under the Commerce 
Clause." 532 U.S. 483, 494 n.7 (2002). 
919 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1990). 
Id. at 1392. 
These findings and declarations state, in pertinent part, that: 
(3) A major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows 
through interstate and foreign commerce. Incidents of the traffic 
which are not an integral part of the interstate or foreign flow, such 
as manufacture, local distribution, and possession, nonetheless 
have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce 
because-
(A) after manufacture, many controlled substances are trans-
ported in interstate commerce, 
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juana and interstate commerce," and following, that" 'federal control 
of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is es-
sential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traf-
fic."'41 And second, by recognizing that the U.S. is party to an 
international agreement mandating the regulation of controlled sub-
stances within the U.S. 42 The appellate court noted that "[ t] he Su-
preme Court has instructed that Congress may regulate those wholly 
intrastate activities which have an effect upon interstate commerce," 
and importantly, "[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that 
class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power 'to 
excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class."43 Concluding, the 
court held 
that Congress may constitutionally regulate intrastate crimi-
nal cultivation of marijuana plants found rooted in the soil. 
[The court deferred] to Congress' findings that controlled 
substances have a detrimental effect on the health and gen-
eral welfare of the American people and that intrastate drug 
activity affects interstate commerce. [And] that local crimi-
nal cultivation of marijuana is within a class of commerce.44 
(B) .. . 
(C) .. . 
(4) Local distribution and possession of controlled substances con-
tribute to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances. 
(5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate 
cannot be differentiated from controlled substances manufactured 
and distributed interstate. Thus, it is not feasible to distinguish, in 
terms of controls, between controlled substances manufactured 
and distributed interstate and controlled substances manufactured 
and distributed intrastate. 
(6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in con-
trolled substances is essential to the effective control of the inter-
state incidents of such traffic. 
(7) The United States is a party to the Single Convention on Nar-
cotic Drugs, 1961, and other international conventions designed to 
establish effective control over international and domestic traffic in 
controlled substances. 
21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000). 
41. Visman, 919 F.2d at 1392 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 801 (6)). 
42. See Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1411, 
520 U.N.T.S. 204; Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
Mar. 25, 1972,26 U.S.T. 1443,976 U.N.T.S. 3. 
43. Visman, 919 F.2d at 1392-93 (quoting, in part, Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 
183, 193 (1968)). 
44. [d. (alteration to original) (citation omitted). See also Proyect v. United 
States, 101 F.3d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1996) ("We therefore join the Fourth Cir-
cuit and the District of Maine in rejecting the claim that § 21 U.S.C. 
841 (a) (1), by criminalizing the act of growing marijuana solely for personal 
consumption, is unconstitutional [and] find that § 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(l) rep-
resents a valid exercise of the commerce power."); United States v. Correa, 
No. 97-20010-01, 1999 WL 155967, at *2 (D. Kan.Jan. 14, 1999) ("Congress 
can properly regulate intrastate drug activities pursuant to its powers under 
the Commerce Clause."); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1112 (4th 
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Although the weight of authority still remains overwhelmingly sup-
portive of the Commerce Clause as a constitutional basis for all of the 
CSA,45 a Ninth Circuit panel, different from the one that decided Vis-
man, muddied the waters when it decided United States v. Raich, deter-
mining that the "intrastate, noncommercial cultivation" and use of 
marijuana for medicinal purposes, when done in conformance with 
California Proposition 215 and when based upon a physician's recom-
mendation, were outside the pale of a CSA grounded upon the Com-
merce Clause.46 
Consequently, the two to one47 Ninth Circuit panel directed the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to enter a 
preliminary injunction against both the Attorney General and the 
Cir. 1995) ("[E]ffective control of the interstate [drug] problems requires 
the regulation of both intrastate and interstate activities, [and] [t]his 
Court, as well as other courts, has relied upon these findings in concluding 
that Congress may regulate intrastate drug activities under the Commerce 
Clause."); United States v. Smith, 920 F.Supp. 245, 247-48 (D. Me. 1996) 
("[E]ven as applied to a defendant who did not engage in interstate com-
merce, the constitutionality of [21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(I)] does not depend 
upon whether the particular defendant engaged in interstate commerce." 
Further, the court believed that "section 841 [was] a constitutional use of 
Congress' power to regulate commerce."); Kuromiya v. United States, 37 F. 
Supp. 2d 717, 724 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (" [T] he CSA, specifically as it pertains to 
marijuana, has a connection with interstate commerce sufficient to invoke 
federal power," and "[t]his conclusion would be no different even if plain-
tiffs could demonstrate the marijuana in individual cases did not travel 
across state lines."); Stubblefield, No. 03-6004-TC at 9 (stating that the argu-
ment that the CSA exceeds Congress' Commerce Clause power "has long 
been foreclosed in all federal circuits .... "). See generally ROBERT L. 
BOGOMOLNY, MICHAEL R. SONNENREICH, & ANTHONY J. ROCCOGRANDI, A 
HANDBOOK ON THE 1970 FEDERAL DRUG ACT 10, 63-4 (1975). In addition to 
congressional commerce and taxing powers as constitutional bases for fed-
eral drug laws, Congress' obligation to protect national health and welfare 
serves as another base. See, e.g., Narcotics Legislation: Investigation of Juvenile 
Delinquency in the Unites States, Hearings on S. 1895, S. 2590 and S. 2637 Before 
the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, 91st Congo 210 (1969) 
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of John N. Mitchell, Att'y Gen. of the 
United States). Even assuming arguendo that the Commerce Clause is not a 
proper constitutional underpinning for the CSA, a treaty can also serve as a 
constitutional basis for federal drugs laws, as "[a] treaty valid under the 
Constitution affords a constitutional basis for an act of Congress to imple-
ment the treaty, even if Congress would not have the power to enact such a law in 
the absence of the treaty." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw 
§ 111 CMT. J (1987) (emphasis added). 
45. See, e.g., United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370, 375 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Kim, 94 F.3d 1247, 1249-50 (9th Cir. 1996); Visman, 919 F.2d at 1393; 
United States v. Montes-Zarate, 552 F.2d 1330, 1331 (9th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Rodriguez-Camacho, 468 F.2d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 1972). 
46. 352 F.3d 1222, 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. 
Ct. 2195 (2005). 
47. The dissenting opinion was authored by a Senior Circuit Judge for the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sitting by designation. 
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DEA Administrator based upon the "unconstitutionality" of the CSA 
in the context of the specific facts of the case.48 
Two California patients and associated "caregivers" [the appellants] 
argued that the Commerce Clause could not properly support the 
criminalization of their activities, which were purely intrastate in char-
acter.49 They claimed the Supreme Court deliberately left this issue 
undecided in its relatively recent decision, United States v. Oakland Can-
nabis Buyers' Cooperative. 50 The Ninth Circuit specifically found that 
the patients and caregivers had "demonstrated a strong likelihood of 
success on their claim that, as applied to them, the CSA is an unconsti-
tutional exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause authority."51 
Angel Raich was "diagnosed with more than ten serious medical 
conditions, including an inoperable brain tumor ... " and was "using 
marijuana as a medication for over five years, every two waking hours 
of every day."52 Her doctor even claimed that in her condition, "fore-
going marijuana treatment may be fatal."53 The second patient, Di-
ane Monson, suffered from "a degenerative disease of the spine" 
causing severe back pain and "constant, painful muscle spasms."54 
Monson's doctor contended that "alternative medications have been 
tried and are either ineffective or produce intolerable side effects."55 
Whereas Monson grew her own marijuana, two anonymous caregivers, 
John Doe Number One andJohn Doe Number Two, had been giving 
Raich her marijuana for free. 56 In the Ninth Circuit's view, however, 
this giving, providing, or transferring of marijuana did not constitute 
the proscribed distribution or even possession with intent to dis-
tribute.57 "Although the Doe appellants are providing marijuana to 
Raich, there is no 'exchange' sufficient to make such activity commer-
cial in character. "58 The Does, as care-giving marijuana growers, 
claimed to have used only "soil, water, nutrients, growing equipment, 
48. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1226, 1235. 
49. Id. at 1228. 
50. Id. at 1234 (citing United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 
U.S. 483, 497) (2002». 
51. Id. at 1227. 
52. Id. at 1225. 
53. Id. 
54. Id 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1228-29. In particular, the Ninth Circuit stated that the "class of activ-
ities" at issue in Raich, "the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, posses-
sion and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the advice of a 
physician and in accordance with state law [,] ... does not involve sale, 
exchange, or distribution." Id. 21 U.S.C. § 802(11) defines "distribute" to 
mean "to deliver (other than by administering or dispensing a controlled 
substance) .... " "Deliver" or "delivery" means "the actual, constructive, or 
attempted transfer of a controlled substance " 21 U.S.C. § 802(8) 
(2000). 
58. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1230 n.3. 
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supplies and lumber originating from or manufactured within Califor-
nia."59 DEA agents seized six of Monson's marijuana plants on August 
15, 2002.60 
The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, 
believing that an insufficient likelihood of success on the merits had 
been established,61 but the Ninth Circuit disagreed.62 Even though 
the Ninth Circuit had previously upheld attacks upon the CSA that 
had been based upon claims that the Commerce Clause was being 
misapplied, none of those previous cases involved "the use, posses-
sion, or cultivation of marijuana for medical purposes. ,,63 The court 
went even further, holding that the patients' and the caregivers' ac-
tions constituted a "separate and distinct class of activities. the intrastate, 
noncommercial cultivation and possession of cannabis for personal 
medical purposes as recommended by a patient's physician pursuant 
to valid California state law."64 
The court applied a four-factor test to determine that the patients' 
and caregivers' activities did not "substantially affect" interstate com-
merce in a manner that Congress could constitutionally regulate: 
(1) whether the statute regulates commerce or any sort of 
economic enterprise; (2) whether the statute contains any 
"express jurisdictional element that might limit its reach to a 
'discrete set' of cases; (3) whether the statute or its legislative 
history contains "express congressional findings" regarding 
the effects of the regulated activity upon interstate com-
merce; and (4) whether the link between the regulated activ-
ity and a substantial effect on interstate commerce is 
'attenuated. ,65 
Examining the first factor, the court concluded that the "cultiva-
tion, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes and not 
for exchange or distribution is not properly characterized as commer-
cial or economic activity. Lacking sale, exchange or distribution, the 
activity does not possess the essential elements of commerce."66 
59. Jd. at 1225. 
60. Jd. Notably, although the DEA was properly identified in the case caption 
as the Drug Enforcement Administration, the DEA was erroneously identi-
fied in the body of the opinion as the Drug Enforcement Agency. 
61. Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp.2d 918, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2003), rev'd, 352 F.3d 
1222, vacated, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
62. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1227. 
63. Jdo 
640 Jdo at 12280 
65. Jdo at 1229 (citing United States v. Morrison; 529 UoS. 598, 610-12 (2000)). 
66. Jdo at 1229-30. Overlooked in this and subsequent cases is the fact that 
there was distribution: John Does #1 and #2 gave Raich the marijuana she 
consumed. Jdo at 1225. 21 U.Soc. § 802 (11) (2000) states that "distribute" 
means to "deliver a controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 802(8), in turn, tells 
us that "deliver" or "delivery" means "the actual, constructive, or attempted 
transfer of a controlled substance. 0 .. " The Raich dissent persuasively ar-
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The Ninth Circuit whisked by the second factor, noting without ex-
planation that the "relevant portions of the CSA" contained no "such 
)urisdictional hook' that would limit the reach of the statute to a dis-
crete set of cases that substantially affect interstate commerce."67 
The Ninth Circuit also breezed by the third consideration, namely 
Congress' particularly expressed intent and understanding that intra-
state marijuana activities are indistinguishable from those occurring 
interstate such that both are subject to regulation under the Com-
merce Clause.68 The court noted that such congressional findings "do 
not specifically address the class of activities at issue here" because in 
the facts before the court, there was no trafficking or distribution.69 
The court added that just because Congress, by virtue of the Com-
merce Clause, said that the CSA applied to activities that appear to be 
purely intrastate in nature "does not necessarily make it SO."70 
Whether the CSA "affect[s] interstate commerce sufficiently to come 
under the constitutional power of the Congress to regulate" it is a 
matter for the courts to ultimately determine?l 
Turning to the last factor, the court found that, indeed, "the link 
between the regulated activity and a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce is 'attenuated."'72 In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit held 
that "[0] n the basis of our consideration of the four factors, we find 
that the CSA, as applied to the appellants, is likely unconstitutional."73 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to square Raich with Visman for many 
of the reasons cogently set forth in Judge Beam's dissent.74 Raich is a 
stretch and even more so given that nowhere in Raich does the major-
ity discuss any other independent constitutional bases for the CSA, 
such as the treaty power of the federal government.75 Further, the 
reach of Raich is hard to know: 76 What is the difference, given the 
Ninth Circuit's Commerce Clause disquisition, between the truly in-
gued that the majority misread and misapplied Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 
111 (1942). Raich, 352 F.2d at 1235. But whether the activity at issue con-
stitutes "commerce" is immaterial. Among other things, Wickard advises 
that even if the activity in question is "local and though it may not be re-
garded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Con-
gress [pursuant to the Commerce Clause] if it exerts a substantial 
economic effect on interstate commerce and this irrespective of whether 
such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' 
or 'indirect.'" 317 U.S. at 125. 
67. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1231 (citation omitted). 
68. Id. at 1233 n.7. 
69. Id. at 1232. 
70. Id. (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614). 
71. Id. (quoting and citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614). 
72. Id. at 1232-33. 
73. Id. at 1234. 
74. Id. at 1235-43 (Beam,]., dissenting). 
75. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
76. How many federal statutes regulating so-called "intrastate" actiVIties are 
grounded upon the Commerce Clause and, based upon Raich, 352 F.3d 
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trastate cultivation and use of marijuana for personal pleasure instead 
of for pain alleviation? And if there is a difference, when did it fall to 
courts to make an exception to plainly expressed statutory language?77 
And did the Ninth Circuit really mean to suggest that transferring a 
controlled substance, albeit both grown and delivered intrastate, is 
also beyond the CSA? 
In his dissent, Judge Beam chastised the two-judge majority for its 
inability to reconcile the facts before it with Wickard. 78 Wickard, a 
unanimous decision, was a case rooted in the regulatory control of the 
nation's economy during the Depression.79 Roscoe Filburn was an 
Ohio dairy and wheat farmer.8o Federal law permitted the establish-
ment of national wheat production quotas in order to avoid wild sw-
ings in the price farmers would receive for their crops,81 and the 
imposition of fines upon those exceeding their individual farms' allot-
ment of the national quota.82 Filburn sued the Secretary of Agricul-
ture, and others, seeking, among other relief, a declaratory judgment 
that the quota, as applied to his farm's excess wheat production, was 
unconstitutional because the regime imposed pursuant to federal stat-
ute and regulation could not properly be based upon the Commerce 
Clause as applied to him.83 Filburn asserted that the excess wheat he 
had grown during 1941 was intended for internal consumption on his 
Ohio farm.84 As the Supreme Court understood the federal statutory 
scheme, the system of wheat production quotas and fines "extend[ed] 
federal regulation to production not intended in any part for commerce 
1222, were open to attack (at least in the Ninth Circuit) prior to Gonzales v. 
Raich, 123 S.Ct. 2195 (2005)? 
77. Chief Justice Marshall "made emphatic the embracing and penetrating na-
ture of [the federal commerce power] by warning that effective restraints 
on its exercise must proceed from political rather than from judicial 
processes." Wickard v. Filburn, 317 u.s. 111,120 (1942) (citing Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,197 (1824)). 
78. "It is simply impossible to distinguish the relevant conduct surrounding the 
cultivation and use of the marijuana crop at issue in this case from the 
cultivation and use of the wheat crop that affected interstate commerce in 
Wickard v. Filburn." Raich, 352 F.3d at 1235 (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. 111). 
79. 317 U.S. 111. 
80. Id. at 114. 
81. Id. at 115. 
82. !d. at 117. 
83. Id. at 113-44. 
84. Id. at 114. In particular, the Court stated: 
[ih has been his practice to raise a small acreage ohvinter wheat, 
sown in the Fall and harvested in the following July; to sell a por-
tion of the crop; to feed part to poultry and livestock on the farm, 
some of which is sold; to use some in making flour for home con-
sumption; and to keep the rest for the following seeding. The in-
tended disposition of the crop here involved has not been 
expressly stated. 
Id. Wickard was assessed a fine of $117.11 for his overage, yet he refused to 
pay the fine. Id. at 115. 
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but wholly for consumption on the farm."85 Filburn contended that 
the "production and consumption of wheat" in the circumstances of 
his case were "local in character, and their effects upon interstate 
commerce [were] at most 'indirect."'86 
Justice Jackson, writing for the Court obseIVed that "the effects of 
many kinds of intrastate activity upon interstate commerce were such 
as to make them a proper subject of federal regulation."87 Indeed, 
the commerce power "extends to those activities intrastate which so 
affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, 
as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of 
a legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power to regu-
late interstate commerce."88 
The justices were not persuaded with the contention that Filburn's 
activity was "local" and therefore could not constitute "commerce" 
and determined that Congress could indeed reach such activity in ap-
propriate circumstances.89 The Court also thought little of Filburn's 
argument that the effect of his crop upon the total market was minis-
cule, stating, "[t]hat appellee's own contribution to the demand for 
wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the 
scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken to-
gether with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial."90 
The Court recognized the potential that "home-consumed" wheat 
might nevertheless enter the market during a period of high prices 
which would then have the unwanted effect of price dampening.91 
"The stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulatory function 
quite as definitely as prohibitions or restrictions thereon."92 The re-
cord before it, added the Court, left "no doubt that Congress may 
properly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm where 
grown if wholly outside the scheme of regulation would have a sub-
stantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose .... "93 Finally, 
echoing Chief Justice Marshall's comments noted earlier,94 the Court 
said that "[t]he conflicts of economic interest ... are wisely left under 
our system to resolution by the Congress under its more flexible and 
responsible legislative process. Such conflicts rarely lend themselves 
85. Id. at 118 (emphasis added). 
86. Id. at 119. 
87. Id. at 122. 
88. Id. at 124 (quoting United States v. Wright Wood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 
III (1942)) (emphasis added). 
89. Id. at 125. 
90. Id. at 127-28. 
91. Id. at 128-29. 
92. Id. at 128. 
93. Id. at 128-29. 
94. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14. 
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to judicial determination. And with the wisdom, workability, or fair-
ness, of the plan of regulation we have nothing to do."95 
As noted above, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Raich was vacated 
and remanded by the Supreme Court in a six-to-three decision inJune 
2005.96 When considering the Court's opinion, it is important to rec-
ognize that there was only a single issue before it: 
The question presented in this case is whether the power 
vested in Congress by Article I, § 8, of the Constitution "to 
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carry-
ing into Execution" its authority to "regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States" includes the 
power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana 
in compliance with California law.97 
Thus, given the posture of the case in the circuit below, other bases 
upon which to undermine (i.e., Ninth or Tenth Amendment infirmi-
ties)98 or support (Le., Treaty Clause power)99 the CSA -which had 
been surfaced by, respectively, detractors and supporters of the fed-
eral ban on "medical" marijuana - were not presented in order to 
garner the Court's evaluation. lOo "[R] espondents' challenge [was] ac-
tually quite limited."lol 
Considering over a century of Commerce Clause case law, the Court 
cautioned (in what perhaps could be viewed as a mild admonishment 
to the Ninth Circuit) that its earlier decisions on the Commerce 
Clause could not be "viewed in isolation."102 Taking that body of deci-
sions together, the Court found that there are but "three general cate-
gories of regulation in which Congress is authorized to engage under 
its commerce power," the last of which was relevant to the instant case; 
that is, Congress' "power to regulate activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce."I03 
Recall that Judge Beam's vigorous dissent in Raich concluded that 
the panel majority's position simply could not be squared with Wick-
95. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 129. 
96. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
97. [d. at 2198-99. "The question before us, however, is not whether it is wise to 
enforce the statute under these circumstances; rather, it is whether Con-
gress' power to regulate interstate markets for medicinal substances encom-
passes the portions of those markets that are supplied with drugs produced 
and consumed locally." [d. at 2201. The Court then immediately asserted: 
"The CSA is a valid exercise of federal power .... " [d. 
98. See infra part III.B.3. 
99. See infra part III.B.2. 
100. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2204-05. 
101. [d. at 2204. 
102. [d. at 2205. 
103. [d. The other two Commerce Clause "general categories of regulation" 
where Congress could properly regulate are with regard "the channels of 
interstate commerce" as well as "the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce, and persons or things in interstate commerce." [d. 
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ard.104 The Supreme Court quickly sided with judge Beam, turned to 
Wickard, and noted that it and other decisions "firmly establishe[d] 
Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an 
economic 'class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce."105 Quoting from earlier cases as far back as 1927,justice 
Stevens, writing for the court, observed that" [w] hen Congress decides 
that the 'total incidence' of a practice poses a threat to a national 
market, it may regulate the entire class" such that "the de minimis char-
acter of individual instances arising under that statute is of no conse-
quence."106 Continuing in this vein, justice Stevens said, restating 
somewhat: "[t]hat the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate ac-
tivity is of no moment."107 This is in keeping with the Court's earlier 
pronouncement that "[a]s we have done many times before, we refuse 
to excise individual [e.g., purely intrastate] components of that larger 
[e.g., interstate] scheme."108 
According to the majority, the Wickard opinion provides "that Con-
gress can regulate a purely intrastate activity that is not itself 'commer-
cial,' in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to 
regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the in-
terstate market in that commodity."109 As was the case with the home-
consumed wheat in Wickard, Congress had, with respect to the CSA, a 
"rational basis"110 for the statute; that is, a concern "that leaving 
home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly af-
fect price and market conditions."111 
The Gonzales "medical" marijuana consumers unsuccessfully at-
tempted to distinguish the facts of their case from Wickard by arguing, 
among other things, that the farm in Wickard was engaged in a "quin-
104. 
105. 
106. 
107. 
108. 
109. 
110. 
111. 
Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1235 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 
III (1942)). 
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2205 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 
(1971) and Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29). 
Id. at 2206 (citation omitted). "Our decision in Wickard is of particular rele-
vance." Id. (citation omitted). "The similarities between this case and Wick-
ard are striking." Id. 
Id. at 2209. 
Id. 
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2206. 
Id. at 2208. The Court also stressed that it "need not determine whether 
respondents' activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate 
commerce in fact, but only whether a 'rational basis' exists for so conclud-
ing." Id. Further: 
[g]iven the enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing be-
tween marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere, 
21 U.S.C. § 801(5), and concerns about diversion into illicit chan-
nels, we have no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational 
basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufac-
ture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the 
CSA. 
Id. at 2209 (footnote omitted). 
Id. at 2207. 
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tessential economic activity;" a "commercial farm" engaged in the sale 
of products grown as part and parcel of that activity.112 The "medical" 
marijuana consumers thus argued that, unlike Wickard, they sold 
nothing and thus did not engage in monetarily-focused or monetarily-
oriented activity."113 That distinction, the Court allowed, was "factu-
ally accurate" but nonetheless does "not diminish the precedential 
force of this Court's reasoning."114 
Even if the agricultural activity at issue in Wickard more easily 
demonstrated a "causal connection between the production for local 
use and the national market," something not necessarily evident in 
the case at bar, the Gonzales Court observed that it nevertheless had 
before it "findings by Congress to the same effect."115 
Supreme Court cases respondents cited as precedent in support of 
their argument, United States v. Lopez,116 and United States v. Morri-
son,117 were inapposite because, with respect to the statutes at issue in 
each of those decisions, there was no regulation of any economic ac-
tivityYs If the focus of the laws were otherwise, such as in the case of 
the CSA, the outcome would be as the Court has previously con-
cluded: '" [w] here economic activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained."'1l9 
As with the agricultural business regulated by statute in Wickard, the 
Court concluded that activities the CSA governs are also "quintessen-
tially economic;" in that "[t]he CSA is a statute that regulates the pro-
duction, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which 
there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market."120 
Next, the Court turned from its evisceration of the respondents' 
arguments to a dissection of the positions advanced by the Ninth Cir-
cuit to support the outcome sought by the "medical" marijuana con-
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 2208 (referring to 21 U.S.C. §§ 801(1)-(6) (2000)). 
116. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Lopez Court ruled that the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause authority and was 
thus unconstitutional. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) (2000). 
117. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Morrison held that the civil remedy section of the 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) exceeded Congress' Commerce 
Clause authority and was thus unconstitutional. Id. at 602 (The VAWA was 
codified at 42 U.S.c. § 13981 (2000)). Subtitle C of Title IV enacted as the 
Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-Motivated Violence Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, § 40301,108 Stat. 1796, 1941 (1994). Title IV was denominated the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994. § 40001, 108 Stat. at 1902. Pub. L. 
No. 103-322 itself was named the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). 
118. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2211. See discussion of regulation of economic activ-
ity in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 and Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. 
119. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2210 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560). 
120. Id. at 2211. 
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sumers.121 As recited earlier, recall that the two-to-one panel in Raich 
v. Ashcroft was able to dodge the sweep of the Commerce Clause by 
simply declaring that the respondents' conduct did not equate to 
commerce; being that, in conformance with State law, "cultivation, 
possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes and not for 
exchange or distribution is not properly characterized as commercial 
or economic activity."122 This discrete class of activities, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reasoned, was simply beyond the pale of what the Constitution's 
drafters had in mind when the Commerce Clause was crafted.123 Tak-
ing this argument on, the Supreme Court emphasized that the issue 
to be parsed was not whether federal criminalization of such conduct 
was wise, but 
whether Congress' contrary policy judgment, i.e., its decision 
to include this narrower 'class of activities' within the larger 
regulatory scheme, was constitutionally deficient. We have 
no difficulty concluding that Congress acted rationally in de-
termining that none of the characteristics making up the 
purported class ... compelled an exemption from the CSA; 
rather, the subdivided class of activities defined by the Court 
of Appeals was an essential part of the larger regulatory 
scheme.124 
The Gonzales Court stated that the fact that the nature of the con-
duct in which Raich and Monson were engaged was an "essential part 
of the larger regulatory scheme" (i.e., the CSA), can be concluded by 
first breaking down the Ninth Circuit's contentions into two parts and 
then systematically refuting them.125 First, the fact that the respon-
dents' marijuana had been prescribed by physicians, which arguably 
transmuted the marijuana into "medicine" (and thus in a class apart), 
is of no moment because "[t]he CSA designates marijuana as contra-
band for any purpose; in fact, by characterizing marijuana as a Sched-
ule I drug, Congress expressly found that the drug has no acceptable 
medical uses."126 The Court added that the "medicinal" use of mari-
juana by respondents is an insufficient discriminator to justify ex-
tracting such use from the CSA's coverage, being that "[t]he mere fact 
that marijuana-like virtually every other controlled substance regu-
lated by the CSA-is used for medicinal purposes cannot possibly 
121. [d. 
122. 352 F.3d at 1229. By this same suspect logic, one would be forced to con-
clude that the "cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana" for recreational 
purposes is also outside the reach of the Commerce Clause. [d. Thus, the 
argument must follow, that Raich's two "caregivers" could quite properly 
cultivate marijuana in any amount and provide it to her for reasons of per-
sonal enjoyment. 
123. [d. at 1227-28. 
124. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2211. 
125. [d. at 2211-12 (citing Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229). 
126. [d. 
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serve to distinguish it from the core activities regulated by the 
CSA."127 
Second, the fact that the respondents' use of marijuana was in con-
formance with California law carried no weight with the majority, as it 
stated: "[t]he Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides ... federal 
power over commerce 'is superior to that of the States to provide for 
the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants,' however legitimate or 
dire those necessities may be."128 
Raich and Monson also argued that their circumstances were 
outside the scope of the CSA's "larger regulatory scheme" because 
their intrastate activity is one both "isolated" as well as "policed" by 
California and thus "entirely separated from the market."129 The Su-
preme Court was unimpressed, commenting that "[t]he notion that 
California law has surgically excised a discrete activity that is hermeti-
cally sealed off from the larger interstate marijuana market is a dubi-
ous proposition, and, more importantly, one that Congress could have 
rationally rejected."130 Such a rational rejection could be based upon 
the commonsense realization that exempting California "medical" 
marijuana users like Raich and Monson from the CSA's reach 
can only increase the supply of marijuana in the California 
market. The likelihood that all such production will 
promptly terminate when patients recover or will precisely 
match the patients' medical needs during their convales-
cence seems remote; whereas the danger that excesses will 
satisfy some of the admittedly enormous demand for recrea-
tional use seems obvious. 131 
Such an inevitable increase of the marijuana supply in the Califor-
nia market would, when combined with that to be expected from the 
eight or so other "medical" marijuana states, lead to the quite rational 
conclusion, one which Congress could have reached, "that the aggre-
gate impact on the national market of all the transactions exempted 
from federal supervision is unquestionably substantial."132 
2. Statute Properly Founded Upon Treaty Clause Power 
In addition to the Commerce Clause, the supremacy of the CSA 
over state enacted amendments like Proposition 215 is supported by 
the incontrovertible preeminence of the federal government in the 
127. Id. at 2212. 
128. Id. (quoting, in part, Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968) (quoting 
Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 426 (1925)). 
129. Id. at 2213 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Ashcroft v. Raich, 
352 F.3d 1222 (No. 03-1454)). 
130. Id. at 2213. 
131. Id. at 2214. 
132. Id. at 2215. 
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field of international relations. I33 The President makes treaties which 
subsequently enter into force upon the consent of two-thirds of the 
Senate.134 Once consented to, treaties are unquestionably the "su-
preme law of the land" and trump any contrary state statutes.135 As 
noted earlier, "[t]he U.S. is a party to the Single Convention on Nar-
cotic Drugs, 1961"136 which, by a number of accounts, mandates the 
enactment and implementation of U.S. domestic legislation. 137 In 
fact, Congress made note of the treaty in its findings and declarations 
with respect to the CSA,138 but interestingly the Single Convention 
does not regulate marijuana uniformly in all instances.139 "The Single 
133. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17 
(1936). 
134. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
135. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
136. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (7) (2000). Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 
1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204. 
137. See, e.g.,John C. Lawn, The Issue of Legalizing Illicit Drugs, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 
703,709 & n.43 (1990). Mr. Lawn was the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) Administrator from 1985-1990. 
If the United States created a legal market in ... marijuana ... it 
would also violate international treaties [including the Single Con-
vention] to which the United States is a signatory ... [and] [u]nder 
these treaties, the United States is obligated to establish and main-
tain effective controls on those substances covered by the trea-
ties .... In order to fulfill the United States' obligations under the 
Single Convention Treaty, domestic legislation must be enacted 
and implemented. 
Id. See also United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1515 (S.D. Fla. 
1990) ("[T]he United States has an affirmative duty to enact and enforce 
legislation to curb illicit drug trafficking under the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs.") (citation omitted). 
138. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (7). See also 21 U.S.c. § 811 (d) (2000). "The bill also specif-
ically recognizes our international obligations under the Single Convention 
of 1961 and will allow the United States to immediately control under the 
schedules of the bill drugs hereafter included under schedules of the Sin-
gle Convention upon the recommendation of the World Heath Organiza-
tion." H.R. REp. No. 91-1444, at 6 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 
4566,4572. 
139. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1408, 520 
U.N.T.S.204. Specifically, the convention does not require that the parties 
enact domestic legislation to restrict marijuana in every case. THE SECRE-
TARY GENERAL, COMMENTARY ON THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC 
DRUGS, 1961 at 276, U.N. Sales No. E.73.x1.l (1973) [hereinafter COMMEN-
TARY]. This is because the degree of control within the treaty scheme varies 
depending upon the portion of the cannabis plant involved. Id. at 276, 
312-13. Indeed, the Convention does not even use the word "marijuana." 
The treaty defines cannabis as "the flowering or fruiting tops of the canna-
bis plant (excluding the seeds and leaves when not accompanied by the 
tops) from which the resin has not been extracted, by whatever name they 
may be designated." Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 42, at 
1409. Thus, "[t]he leaves of the cannabis plant, when not accompanied by 
the tops of the plant, are not 'cannabis,' and being listed neither in Sched-
ule I nor in Schedule II are not 'drugs' in the sense of the Single Conven-
tion." COMMENTARY at 315. Article 28 of the Single Convention provides 
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Convention is not self-executing, but works through the constitutional 
and legal systems of its signatory nations."140 Inasmuch as the Single 
Convention was not a self-executing treaty, domestic legislation was 
that "[i]f a Party permits the cultivation of the cannabis plant for the pro-
duction of cannabis or cannabis resin, it shall apply thereto the system of 
controls as provided in article 23 respecting the control of the opium 
poppy." Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 42, 18 U.S.T. at 
1421,520 U.N.T.S. at 240 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Single Con-
vention does not apply to cannabis cultivation that is "exclusively for indus-
trial purposes (fibre and seed) or horticultural purposes." Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 39, 18 U.S.T. at 1421, 520 
U.N.T.S. at 240. The third paragraph in Article 28 states that "[t]he Parties 
shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to prevent the misuse of, 
and illicit traffic in, the leaves of the cannabis plant." Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, supra note 39, 18 U.S.T. at 1421, 520 U.N.T.S. at 206 (em-
phasis added). This would suggest that the convention parties contem-
plated the legal traffic and proper use of cannabis leaves. "Parties are not 
bound to prohibit the consumption of the leaves for non-medical purposes, 
but only to take the necessary measures to prevent their misuse." COMMEN-
TARY at 316. "The convention does not specify any mandatory controls the 
parties must adopt as to the leaves." Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Mari-
juana Laws (NORML) v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d 654, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
" [T] he descheduling of those marih uana mixtures containing only leaves 
(no flowers or resins) would be actions consistent with our international 
obligations." Petition to decontrol marihuana; Interpretation of Section 
201 of the Controlled Substance Act of 1970, Op. Off. Legal Counsell, 14 
(1972) . 
Article 22, which is a "[s]pecial provision applicable to cultivation," 
leaves the issue of control over the cultivation of marijuana to the unfet-
tered judgment of each treaty party: "[ w] henever the prevailing conditions 
in the country ... render the prohibition of the cultivation of ... the 
cannabis plant the most suitable measure, in its opinion, for protecting the 
public health and welfare and preventing the diversion of drugs into the 
illicit traffic, the Party concerned shall prohibit cultivation." Single Conven-
tion on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 39, 18 U.S.T. at 1419, 520 D.N.T.S. at 
232. "[T]he authors of article 22 did not consider that any diversion 
whatever constitutes ipso facto a problem of public health and welfare, but 
only one which is sufficiently large to present such a problem. A Party is 
therefore not bound to prohibit cultivation if the drug in question is di-
verted only in relatively minor quantities." COMMENTARY at 275. 
But what is marijuana? Marijuana is a "mixture of leaves, stems, and 
flowering tops of the Indian hemp plant," Cannabis sativa, smoked or eaten 
for hallucinogenic and pleasure-giving effects. GROLIER INC., THE ENCYCLO-
PEDIA AMERICANA, 317-18 (1998). 
The psychoactive ingredient of marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinol 
(THC), is concentrated in the flowering tops. [d. at 317. Marijuana is de-
fined in the CSA as "all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether grow-
-ing or not. ... Such term does not include the mature stalks of such plant, 
or fiber produced from such stalks. 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (2000). The DEA 
has changed its definition of THC; no longer does the definition only con-
sist of the naturally occurring variety restricted as emanating from (argua-
bly) only the "plant Cannabis sativa L." but is now said to derive from plants 
"of the genus Cannabis (cannabis plant) ," as well as "synthetic equivalents of 
the substance contained in the cannabis plant." 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (d) (30) 
(2005). 
140. United States v. Feld, 514 F. Supp. 283, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). 
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necessary so that the U.S. could satisfy its international legal obliga-
tions manifested by and in the treaty. 141 For example, it is clear that 
21 U.S.C. §§ 841,952 and 955 are among the penal provisions that the 
United States has adopted to effectuate its treaty obligations under 
the Single Convention."142 Of necessity, Congress had the Single 
Convention in mind as a foundational underpinning for the CSA: 
"The bill [H.R. 18583, ie., the CSA] also specifically recognizes our 
international obligations under the Single Convention of 1961 and 
will allow the United States to immediately control, under the sched-
ules of the bill drugs hereafter included under schedules of the Single 
Convention upon the recommendation of the World Health 
Organization."143 
Furthermore, the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC) concluded in a 1972 opinion written to DEA's predecessor 
agency that "full compliance with our obligations under the Single 
Convention could not be achieved unless marihuana is listed under 
Schedule I or Schedule II of the [CSA] ."144 
The command of the "drug" treaty following the 1961 Single Con-
vention was clearer with regard to the parties' prohibition of psycho-
tropic substances. Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the "physiologically 
active chemical ... from hemp plant resin that is the chief intoxicant 
in marijuana"145 is in Schedule I of the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances.146 With respect to Schedule I substances, the treaty par-
ties are to "prohibit all use except for scientific and very limited medi-
cal purposes by duly authorized persons, in medical or scientific 
141. "If an international agreement or one of its provisions is non-self-executing, 
the United States is under an international obligation to adjust its laws and 
institutions as may be necessary to give effect to the agreement." Restate-
ment (third) of foreign relations law of the united states § 111 cmt. h 
(1987). 
142. Feld, 514 F. Supp. at 288 (citing United States v. LaFroscia, 354 F. Supp. 
1338, 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) and United States v. Rodriguez-Camacho, 468 
F.2d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 1972». In La J?roscia, the court stated that, 
there is an alternative ground [to Congress's constitutional author-
ity to regulate commerce with foreign nations] for upholding the 
constitutionality of the [Controlled Substances] Act. The United 
States is a party to the Single Convention ... which binds all signa-
tories to control persons and enterprises engaged in the manufac-
ture, trade and distribution of specified drugs. Marihuana is so 
specified .... It is clear that these provisions [e.g., 21 U.S.c. 
§ 811 (d)] justify the placement of marihuana in Schedule I [of the 
CSA] because of the United States' treaty obligations. 
La Froscia, 354 F. Supp. at 1341. 
143. H.R. REp. No. 91-1444, at 6, 28 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 4566, 
4572. 
144. Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 138. 
145. 68 Fed. Reg. 14,114 n.l (Mar. 21, 2003) (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1999». 
146. Feb. 21, 1971,32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 328. The treaty entered into 
force in the U.S. on July 15, 1980, a decade after passage of the CSA. 
26 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 35 
establishments which are directly under the control of their Govern-
ments or specifically approved by them .... "147 
Not only is the federal government obligated under this interna-
tional drug treaty regime, but the individual states are as wel1. 148 "As 
law of the United States, international law is also the law of every State, 
is a basis for the exercise of judicial authority by State courts, and is 
cognizable in cases in State courts, in the same way as other United 
States law."149 
The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), "the indepen-
dent and quasi-judicial monitoring body for the implementation of 
the United Nations international drug control conventions ... estab-
lished in 1968 in accordance with the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, 1961,"150 underscored its understanding that the United States 
would continue to make sure that state laws would not be inconsistent 
with the cannabis circumscriptions contained in the three major inter-
national drug conventions in its 2002 annual report. 151 In this report, 
"[t]he Board notes that, in several states in the United States, discus-
sions on liberalizing or legalizing cannabis continue," and that "[t]he 
Board appreciates that the Government continues to ensure that na-
tionallaws in line with the international drug control treaties are en-
forced in all states."152 This suggests that, at least from the INCB's 
perspective, the United States would fall out of compliance with the 
international drug conventions should the individual states enact ma-
rijuana legislation inconsistent with the manner in which the drug is 
treated in the CSA. 
3. Ninth and Tenth Amendments 
Another argument favored in unsuccessful assaults upon the CSA 
stems not from the contention that it is an invalid legislative attempt 
to implement Commerce Clause powers,153 but rather, that it is an 
147. 
148. 
149. 
150. 
151. 
152. 
153. 
Id., 32 U.S.T. at 553, 1019 U.N.T.S. at 182-93. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RElATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ III cmt. d (1986). 
Id. Note that should a state supreme court have occasion to rule on the 
validity of a state statute in the face of a treaty with contrary, "repugnant" 
provisions, the case would be reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court, on 
writ of certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000). 
Mandate and Functions, http://www.incb.org/incb/mandate.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 11, 2005). 
Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Operation of 
the international drug control system at 11, http://www.incb.org/incb/ 
en/ annual_reporC2002.html (2002). See also Report of the International 
Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Analysis of the world situation at 44 
n.302, http://www.incb.org/incb/ en/annuaIJeporc2002.html (2002). 
Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Analysis of 
the world situation at 44 n.302, http://www.incb.org/incb/en/annuaIJe-
porc2002.html (2002). 
See, e.g., United States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390, 1392-93 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(citing United States v. Rodriguez-Camacho, 468 F.2d 1220, 1221 (9th Cir. 
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outright contravention of the Ninth 154 and Tenth 155 Amendments. 156 
As easily as courts have dispelled the Commerce Clause attacks, so too 
have they handily dismissed arguments on these grounds. 157 For ex-
ample, in United States v. Kuromiya, the court asserted that "[t]he fun-
damental problem with the . . . argument is that 'the Ninth 
Amendment has not been interpreted as independently securing any 
constitutional rights for purposes of making out a constitutional viola-
tion'" and "as there is no constitutional provision by which one can 
discern a fundamental right to possess, use, grow, or sell marijuana, it 
is equally untenable to claim that there is a Ninth Amendment right 
violated by its criminalization."158 Further, the Kuromiya court stated 
that "so long as the passage of a federal criminal statute is a valid exer-
cise of congressional commerce power, no violation of the Tenth 
Amendment occurs."159 
C. State/Local and Federal Law in Conflict 
1. Impermissible Interference 
Having definitively concluded that the CSA reflects the proper exer-
cise by Congress of an enumerated constitutional power - commerce 
powerl60 - we next turn to an examination of whether state and local 
laws permitting personal use of marijuana for alleged therapeutic pur-
poses are an impermissible interference, by whatever definition or 
154. 
155. 
156. 
157. 
158. 
159. 
160. 
1972) (holding that Congress may constitutionally regulate intrastate drug 
activity due to its effects on interstate commerce)). 
U.S. CONST. amend. IX. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people." [d. 
U.S. CONST. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people." [d. 
See, e.g., United States v. Kuromiya, 37 F. Supp. 2d 717, 725 (holding that 
the CSA is constitutional in light of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments). 
[d. See also San Diego County Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121 
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked Ninth Amendment stand-
ing to challenge the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994). 
Kuromiya, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 725 (quoting Reno, 98 F.3d at 1125) (discussing 
constitutionality of the CSA)). See also The Findings and Recommendations for 
Stubblefzeld v. Ashcroft, No. 03-6004-TC at 11, available at https:/ /ecf.ord.us-
courts.gov/ (D. Or. filed Mar. 24, 2003). 
37 F. Supp. 2d at 725. Other Constitutional provisions have also been used, 
without success, as a basis for contesting the CSA's legality. Specifically, 
"[t]he CSA has been attacked on various constitutional grounds, including 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Commerce Clause, the First, 
Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, as well as Equal Protection and Due Pro-
cess." Blaine, supra note 28, at 1210. See also Stubblefield, Civ. No. 03-6004-
TC at 10-12 available at https://ecf.ord.uscourts.gov/ (D. Or. Mar. 24, 
2003) (holding that the CSA violates neither the Ninth or Tenth Amend-
ments, nor the Due Process Clause). 
Kuromiya, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 725. 
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classification, with the CSA. The conclusion seems too easy. The ap-
plication of such state and local laws of necessity - constituting a re-
gime - not only implicate federal law, but contravene it as well. The 
law is well settled, being that "[t]he Supreme Court has [sic] stated 
that a federal statute may pre-empt state law ... where either (a) com-
pliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or (b) a state law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress."161 
The Supreme Court, albeit in the context of alien registration, had 
occasion to consider whether a state statute could stand in the face of 
a federal law, the latter having been enacted to make a "harmonious 
whole" of the alien registration regime, and passed pursuant to the 
national government's "full and exclusive responsibility for the con-
duct of affairs with foreign sovereignties."162 The Court asserted that 
the test to be applied was whether the state "law stands as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress."163 The Court concluded that the state alien regis-
tration statute could not be enforced and that the ruling of the court 
below, which had enjoined application of the state law, would be 
affirmed. 164 
In Straight Creek Bus v. Saylor,165 a bus company, Bell Coach Lines, 
doing business in Kentucky during World War II could not commence 
operations without first securing both a "certificate of war necessity" 
from the Federal Office of Defense Transportation (ODT) and a cer-
tificate of convenience and necessity from the Kentucky Division of 
Motor Transportation (DMT) .166 If operations were not begun within 
sixty days after receiving the state certificate, however, the governing 
statute provided that the certificate "shall become null and void."167 A 
competitor of Bell's [the appellant], who wanted to provide services 
over the same bus routes at stake, brought the matter to the attention 
of the DMT director that Bell had not begun operating after the req-
uisite sixty days, and thus sought a determination that Bell's certificate 
be nullified as provided by state law. 168 
Bell protested, claiming that it had been advised by "Federal author-
ities charged with the responsibility of issuing gasoline and approving 
public transportation operations" not to start operations until further 
notice. 169 Bell had heeded this advice, as it did not want to jeopardize 
its future chances to secure rationed gas, tires, etc. if it actually began 
161. 16A AM. JUR. 2n Constitutional Law § 243 (1998). 
162. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63, 73 (1941). 
163. Id. at 67. 
164. Id. at 74. 
165. 185 S.W.2d 253 (Ky. Ct. App. 1945). 
166. Id. at 253-54. 
167. Id. at 254. 
168. Id. at 253-54. 
169. Id. at 254. 
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bus service. 170 Bell, therefore, simply waited and did nothing. 171 
Thus, Bell was presented with a classic Hobson's choice, because if it 
had begun service pursuant to the Kentucky certificate, the carrier 
would be contravening the caution that it wait. 172 The Court of Ap-
peals of Kentucky found no conflict, because securing a Certificate of 
War Necessity from the federal government "cannot plausibly be said 
. . . [to] suspend [] a state statute which commands nothing to the 
contrary, but merely withdraws a privilege .... "173 In the course of 
reaching this conclusion, and importantly for our purposes, the jus-
tices also remarked that "since the federal Constitution is the supreme 
law of the land, a federal enactment authorized by that instrument 
prevails over a state statute and suspends the operation of the latter 
when its enforcement would necessitate or sanction the performance 
of an act prohibited by the former."174 
This is precisely the issue with which we are confronted: State and 
local "medical" marijuana initiatives sanction conduct that the CSA 
prohibits and because of the supremacy clause, they cannot stand in 
the face of federal law to the contrary.175 For example, one recent law 
review Note reached the same conclusion, stating, "the California 
Compassionate Use Act176 and the federal CSA are in direct con-
flict. . . . The CSA does not exempt the distribution of marijuana to 
seriously ill persons for their personal medical use .... Therefore, 
based on the Supremacy Clause, the CSA preempts any contrary state 
law."177 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. (emphasis added). Straight Creek Bus was cited with approval not too 
long ago, in the Opinions of the Attorney General of Kentucky. 95-33 Op. 
Atty. Gen. Ky. 2-126 to 2-127 (1995). "[I]f the laws or public policy of the 
states comes into conflict with the federal statutes ... the state law must 
yield. The prohibition of a federal statute may not be set at naught ... by 
state statutes ... and the extent and nature of the legal consequences of an 
act which is made unlawful by federal law are determined by that law, con-
flicting state policy or law notwithstanding." 81A Cj.S. States § 24 (1977). 
175. SeeGonzalesv. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195,2212 (2005). 
176. CAL. HEALTH & SAFE"IY CODE § ll362.5 (West Supp. 2005). 
177. Blaine, supra note 28, at 1218-19. Note that the case Blaine is discussing, 
United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, confusingly seems to speak out of 
both sides of the mouth while discussing the ramifications of the California 
Compassionate Use Act. 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, llOO (N.D. Cal. 1998), rev'd, 
532 U.S. 483 (2001) (The Compassionate Use Act was added by initiative 
measure, Proposition 215, § 1, approved November 1996). On the one 
hand, the court says that the "[dJefendants are correct that Proposition 215 
does not conflict with federal law . .. because on its face it does not purport 
to make legal any conduct prohibited by federal law; it merely exempts 
certain conduct by certain persons from the California drug laws." Id. at 
1100 (emphasis added); cf Marijuana Policy Project v. D.C. Bd. of Elections 
and Ethics, 191 F. Supp. 2d 196, 206-07 (D.D.C. 2002), rev'd, 46 Fed. Appx. 
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2. Mere Enactment of State Medical Use Statute vs. Affirmative Con-
duct Consistent with State Statute 
An argument can be made that medical use statutes, in and of 
themselves, depending upon how they are drafted, do not pose a con-
flict with the CSA. 178 A conflict comes into being, so the argument 
goes, only when a person affirmatively acts or does what the medical 
use statute permits, thus not running afoul of the state or local law, 
633, 2002 WL 31098318 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Yet with its next breath, the Cali-
fornia federal court also says that 
[n]otwithstanding the operative language of Proposition 215, its 
declared purpose ... suggests that California's voters want to ex-
empt medical marijuana from prosecution under federal, as well as 
state law, even if that is not what they enacted. A state law which 
purpmts to legalize the distribution of marijuana for any purpose, 
however, even a laudable one, nonetheless directly conflicts with 
federal law, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). 
Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 (emphasis added). The 
court's second interpretation is in line with Straight Creek Bus, 185 S.W.2d at 
254 and M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,425-26. See also 
BOGOMOLNY, supra note 43, at 143; stating: 
There is no question that a state can remove all criminal sanc-
tions for drug sale or possession without coming into conflict with 
the federal law. The problem will corne when a state attempts to deregulate 
a given drug and permits its sale contrary to the federal law. More likely 
than not, this will be deemed a positive conflict and the state law will fall. 
Thus, in the regulatory area, states are left with the option of not 
legislating at all or legislating in a manner which conforms with 
federal law. (Emphasis added). 
Note that in Cannabis Cultivators Club, the district court issued a pre-
liminary injunction pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 882(a) preventing various can-
nabis clubs, also including the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative 
(OCBC), from distributing marijuana to patients claiming a medical need. 
5 F. Supp. 2d at 1l04, 1l06. Section 882(a) authorizes "enjoin[ing] viola-
tions" of the CSA. See 21 U.S.C. § 882(a) (1999). Among other things, 
OCBC then moved the district court to modify the injunction to permit the 
distribution of cannabis to patients with a doctor's certificate, indicating 
that marijuana was a "medical necessity" for the patient. United States v. 
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1999) (per 
curiam). The district court denied the motion believing that such equita-
ble powers as it possessed were insufficient to override the CSA. Id. The 
Ninth Circuit did not vacate the injunction, but remanded with instructions 
"to reconsider [OCBC's] request for a modification that would exempt 
from the injunction distribution to seriously ill individuals who need canna-
bis for medical purposes." Id. at 1115. The district court proceeded as 
urged, modifying its preliminary injunction to accommodate medical ne-
cessity, whereupon the United States successfully petitioned for certiorari. 
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., No. C98-0088, 2000 WL 
1517166 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2000). The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that medical necessity is not an exception to the CSA's prohibition against 
the "manufacture and distribution" of marijuana. United States v. Oakland 
Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 486 (2001). 
178. See, e.g., Blaine, supra note 28, at 1218-19 (stating the CSA only dominates 
state statutes when the language used prevents both statutes from co-
existing). 
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but violating only the CSA. 179 As an example, California Proposition 
215 in part and by its terms offers marijuana possessors, patients, and 
primary caregivers absolution from California drug lawsI80 that would, 
in the absence of Proposition 215, otherwise criminalize their 
conduct. I8I 
Assuming it to be the case that there is no "actual" conflict between 
statutes like Proposition 215 and the CSA until one affirmatively per-
forms an act in conformance with the state law which, at one and the 
same time, nevertheless constitutes a CSA violation, where does that 
leave us? Let us submit that the difference is one without a meaning-
ful distinction because the federal government can always successfully 
prosecute the CSA violator regardless of whether the moment of con-
flict arises at the time the state statute is enacted or at the time the 
subject possesses or "cultivate [s]" marijuana. 182 Put differently, a CSA 
violation stands alone, and it is irrelevant whether the conduct that it 
prohibits is consistent with or also in conflict with Proposition 215. 183 
The only reason that we can fathom why it might matter whether 
laws like Proposition 215 are, at their moment of enactment, in con-
flict with the CSA is that one could argue that such statutes are void ab 
initio. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had occasion to consider 
the viability of a conviction for violation of a state sedition law in the 
face of the defendant's argument that it was preempted by the federal 
sedition statute, the Smith Act, addressing the same subject matter. I84 
The defendant argued that enactment of the federal law automatically 
suspended operation of its Pennsylvania counterpart. I85 The Penn-
sylvania court agreed, quashed the state indictment, and in the course 
of its analysis looked at the disparate sentencing schemes in the two 
statutes, the state statute being much harsher. 186 Using language ap-
plicable a fortiori to the CSA-Proposition 215 schism, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court said, 
179. Id. at 1219. 
180. "Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, 
relating to the cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a 
patient's primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the 
personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recom-
mendation or approval of a physician." CAL. HEALTH & SAFElY CODE 
§ 11362.5(d) (West 2005). 
181. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFElY CODE §§ 11257-58 (West 1991). 
182. See 21 U.S.c. § 844(a), (c) (1999). See also Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 
2195,2212 (2005) ("[TJhe CSA would still impose controls required by Cal-
ifornia law."). 
183. U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1100 (N.D. 
Cal. 1998). 
184. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 104 A.2d 133, 136 n.2, 139 (Pa. 1954), affd,350 
U.S. 497 (1956). At the time of this ruling, the Smith Act was codified at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2384-85 (1948). 
185. Nelson, 104 A.2d at 137 (emphasis added). 
186. Id. at 136, 139. 
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[s]uch a disparity [20 yrs. v. 6-10 yrs. for a Smith Act viola-
tion] in the sentences prescribed for the same offense, if 
multiplied by further like instances from other States, could 
not help but confuse and hinder the attack on sedition 
which calls for uniform action on a national basis. U niform-
ity in the range of sentences imposable throughout the coun-
try for sedition against the Government of the United States 
is assured only by the exclusive use of the federal statute. 187 
D. Enjoining the Operation of State Statutes 
There is precedent for the proposition that the federal government 
can successfully institute a suit against a state whose laws permit what 
federal enactment and the Constitution prohibit. In United States v. 
Mississippi188 the Attorney General filed a complaint against the state 
of Mississippi, three members of the state's Board of Election Commis-
sioners, and six county Registrars of Voters seeking, in part, an order 
to restrain the continued enforcement of Mississippi state constitu-
tional provisions and laws that had the cumulative effect of "hamper-
ing and destroying the right of Negro citizens of Mississippi to vote," 
in contravention of both federal law, 42 U.S.c. § 1971 (a), Article I of 
the United States Constitution, as well as the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments. 189 
The lower court dismissed the federal complaint,190 and the Su-
preme Court, completely unimpressed with Mississippi's arguments 
187. Id. at 139. Although conceded supra that states have concurrent jurisdic-
tion with the U.S. regarding controlled substances, this does nothing to 
dissipate the strength of the argument that the country cannot have statu-
tory schemes covering the same subject area which move in different if not 
opposite directions. 
188. 380 U.S. 128 (1965). 
189. Id. at 130. 42 U.S.c. § 1971 (a) (1) (2000) presently provides that all U.S. 
citizens "otherwise qualified by law to vote ... shall be entitled and allowed 
to vote ... without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude; any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State ... to 
the contrary notwithstanding." 
Taken together the state laws imposed literacy standards upon voter 
applicants that could be interpreted and applied totally at the discretion of 
voting officials resulting in the registration of a large number of white ap-
plicants and very few blacks. Mississippi, 380 U.S. at 131-32. The consequent 
voter registration figures were completely out ofline with the racial propor-
tional representation or makeup in the population as a whole. See Frank 
Hobbs and Nicole Stoops, Demographic Trends in the 20th Century at 93, 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf (Nov. 2002) (stating 
the population of Mississippi was 43.5% black in 1950). 
The Fifteenth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of citizens of the 
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by ... any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude [and that] [t]he 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §§ 1, 2. 
190. United States v. Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925, 958 (D.C. Miss. 1964). 
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and the lower court's logic, reversed and remanded.191 Contrary to 
the state's position, the justices found that, 1) there was statutory lan-
guage permitting the federal government's suit,192 2) the state of Mis-
sissippi could be, and was properly made, a defendant in the lawsuit in 
accordance with the particular terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (C),193 and 3) 
that Congress had the constitutional power pursuant to the Fifteenth 
Amendment, and was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, to 
properly make Mississippi a defendant.194 With regard to the last 
point, the Supreme Court said that neither the Eleventh Amendment 
nor "any other provision of the Constitution prevents or has ever been 
seriously supposed to prevent a State's being sued by the United 
States."195 This is so, even in the absence of any Congressional enact-
ment specifically authorizing or permitting such a suit.196 In particu-
lar, "[t]he United States in the past has in many cases been allowed to 
file suits in this and other courts against States, with or without specific 
authorization from Congress."197 
Perhaps an even more compelling case that would lend credence to 
federal efforts to enjoin state "medical" marijuana laws, which the Mis-
sissippi Court cited, is United States v. California. 198 In an original juris-
diction cause of action, the federal government sued the state in the 
Supreme Court claiming that California had improperly sold leases 
permitting private companies to extract mineral deposits, as well as 
petroleum and natural gas off its coast.199 The United States claimed 
that the surface below the nation's territorial sea belonged to the fed-
eral government and not to California.20o The state countered, con-
191. MississiPPi, 380 U.S. at 144. 
192. Id. at 138. "Section 1971 was passed by Congress under authority of the 
Fifteenth Amendment to enforce the Amendment's guarantee, which pro-
tects against any discrimination by a State, its laws, its customs, or its offi-
cials in any way." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (2000». 
193. Id. at 139-42. Section 1971(c) provides that racially discriminatory acts en-
gaged in by State personnel "shall also be deemed that of the State and the 
State may be joined as a party defendant." This language is quoted in Mis-
sissippi, 380 U.S. at 139. 
194. Id. at 140. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
one of the United States by Citizens of another State. " U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI (emphasis added). 
195. Mississippi, 380 U.S. at 140. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
198. 332 U.S. 19 (1947). The Supreme Court characterized the nature of the 
federal government suit as a prayer "for a decree declaring the rights of the 
United States in the area as against California and enjoining California and 
all persons claiming under it from continuing to trespass upon the area in 
violation of the rights of the United States." Id. at 23 (emphasis added). 
199. Id. at 22. 
200. Id. At the time of suit, the territorial sea claimed by the United States ex-
tended "three nautical miles outward from the shore." Id. at 24 n.1. 
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tending that the three mile "ocean belt" was within California's 
original boundary when it was admitted as a state to the union.201 
In support of its case, California surfaced a number of intriguing 
arguments, one being that the litigation was not properly before the 
court inasmuch as it presented "no case or controversy in a legal 
sense, but only a difference of opinion between federal and state offi-
cials."202 The Supreme Court quickly disposed of this argument, as-
serting that while the State's characterization was not necessarily 
incorrect, the nature of the action was 
far more than that. ... The difference involves the conflict-
ing claims of federal and state officials as to which govern-
ment, state or federal, has a superior right to take or 
authorize the taking of vast quantities of oil and gas under-
neath that land. . . . Such concrete conflicts as these consti-
tute a controversy in the classic legal sense, and are the very 
kind of differences which can only be settled by agreement, 
arbitration, force, or judicial action .... [There exist] con-
flicting claims of governmental powers to authorize [the sea-
bed's] use.203 
California had argued, unsuccessfully, before the Supreme Court 
that "the Attorney General has not been granted power either to file 
or maintain [the suit] ."204 The Supreme Court concluded otherwise, 
plainly stating that 
20l. 
202. 
203. 
204. 
205. 
Congress has given a very broad authority to the Attorney 
General to institute and conduct litigation in order to estab-
lish and safeguard government rights and properties .... An 
Act passed by Congress and signed by the President could, of 
course, limit the power previously granted the Attorney Gen-
eral to prosecute claims for the Government .... But no Act 
of Congress has amended the statutes which impose on the 
Attorney General the authority and du~ to protect the Gov-
ernment's interests through the courts. 05 
Id. at 23. 
Id. at 24. This position is similar to the claim that "medical" marijuana laws 
are not truly in conflict with the CSA until such time as an individual com-
mits an act consistent with the state law which will at the same moment 
constitute a CSA violation. Also, like the California facts, the "medical" ma-
rijuana landscape is a conflict in government powers as to which sovereign 
has overriding, supreme authority to regulate marijuana. 
Id. at 24-25. 
Id. at 26. 
Id. at 27-28 (citing, in part, In reCooper, 143 U.S. 472, 502-03 (1892». In 
discussing where and how Congress gave a "broad authority to the Attorney 
General to institute and conduct litigation," the Supreme Court made ref-
erence to 5 U.S.C. §§ 291 and 309-neither of which exist in Title 5 to-
day-and a number of earlier decisions of the Court, including United States 
v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888). Id. at 27. In San Jacinto Tin Co., 
the Attorney General brought an action against San Jacinto and two other 
2005] Medical Marijuana: A Toke Too Far 35 
The justices soon turned to the merits of the case, but before doing 
so, commented upon the roles or "hats worn" by the United States in 
pursuing this cause of action against California.206 One of these roles 
appears to be closely akin to the reasoning underlying the federal gov-
ernment's motivation for attempting to enjoin or invalidate state 
"medical" marijuana laws: protection of the nation's citizenry.207 
Thus, one such guise assumed by the United States, is its assertion of 
"the right and responsibility to exercise whatever power and domin-
ion are necessary to protect this country against dangers to the secur-
ity and tranquility of its people incident to the fact that the United 
States is located immediately adjacent to the ocean."208 
Important for a "medical" marijuana preemption argument is the 
conclusion that although both the federal government and the states 
have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction in the area, to the extent a 
conflict exists, there can only be one supreme sovereign and that must 
be the national government. 209 In California, the State contended that 
it properly exercised aspects of its authority out to three miles from 
the low tide mark.210 The Supreme Court swept this argument aside, 
stating: "[ c] onceding that the state has been authorized to exercise 
local police power functions in the part of the marginal belt within its 
companies, alleging that land patents issued by the U.S. were improperly 
procured by dint of a survey that had been fraudulently conducted. 125 
U.S. 274-75. Consequently, the federal government prayed that the survey 
and patent be "set aside, vacated, and annulled." Id. at 275. One of the 
issues raised by the defendant was whether the Attorney General even had 
the authority under statute or the Constitution to commence the action. Id. 
at 274. The Supreme Court first looked to the predecessor, Revised Stat-
utes § 346, of present day 28 U.S.c. § 501 (2000). Id. The present day 
statute is similarly worded to its ancestor, providing that "[t]he Department 
of Justice is an executive department of the United States at the seat of 
Government." 28 U.S.C. § 501 (2000). Upon consideration of this legisla-
tion, the Court observed: 
There is no very specific statement of the general duties of the At-
torney General, but it is seen from the whole chapter referred to 
that he has the authority, and it is made his duty, to supervise the 
conduct of all suits brought by or against the United States .... If 
the United States, in any particular case, has ajust cause for calling 
upon the judiciary of the country, in any of its courts for re-
lief ... the question of the appeal to the judicial tribunals of the 
country must primarily be decided by the Attorney General of the 
United States. 
San jacinto Tin, 125 U.S. at 278-79. The current version of 28 U.S.c. § 518 
derives from former 5 U.S.c. § 309. See 28 U.S.C. § 518(b) (2000) (Histori-
cal and Revision Notes). 28 U.S.C. § 518(b) states "[w]hen the Attorney 
General considers it in the interests of the United States, he may personally 
conduct and argue any case in a court of the United States in which the 
United States is interested .... "). 
206. California, 332 U.S. at 29. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text. 
210. California, 332 U.S. at 29-30. 
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declared boundaries, these do not detract from the federal govern-
ment's paramount rights in and power over this area."211 
Another relevant opinion was written by the Supreme Court in 
Philko Aviation v. Shacket, which involved a conflict between two swin-
dled purchasers of the same aircraft who were seeking to determine 
title.212 The Shackets paid full price, and took possession of, an air-
craft in Illinois.213 The seller, a con artist, promised to provide the 
"paperwork" at a later date but never did.214 He then tried to sell the 
same airplane to Philko Aviation and provided the aircraft title docu-
ments to Philko at closing.215 Philko's financing bank "recorded the 
title documents with the Federal Aviation Administration," (FAA) 
whereupon the Shackets sought to quiet title by commencing a declar-
atory judgment action.216 The Shackets won in the lower courts but 
the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.217 
At issue were the procedures required to perfect title to the air-
craft.218 In the words of the Supreme Court, § 503(c) of the·Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958 prohibited the transfer of aircraft titles "from 
having validity against innocent third parties unless the transfer [had] 
been evidenced by a written instrument, and the instrument [had] 
been recorded with the Federal Aviation Administration."219 Philko 
argued that because it, and not the Shackets, had recorded the sale 
with the FAA, the airplane was theirs.220 The Shackets countered, 
claiming that they acquired title under the Illinois Uniform Commer-
cial Code (UCC), which stated that not only did title transfers not 
have to be recorded, but they did not even require written evidence of 
sale if payment was "made and received."221 Writing for the court, 
Justice White construed § 503(c) to require both an "instrument" evi-
dencing all aircraft transfers and the recordation of that document 
with the FAA. 222 Thus, "because of these federal requirements, state 
laws permitting undocumented or unrecorded transfers are pre-
211. Id. at 36. 
212. 462 U.S. 406, 407-08 (1983). 
213. Id. at 407. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 408. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 407. 
219. Id. (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44108 (2000» (citation omitted). 
220. Id. at 408. 
221. Id. at 408-09. See ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/2-201(c) (West 1993). 
222. Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 409-10. Section 503(c) provides: 
No conveyance or instrument the recording of which is provided 
for ... shall be valid in respect of such aircraft ... against any per-
son other than the [transferee], his heir or devisee, or any person 
having actual notice thereof, until such conveyance or other instru-
ment is filed for recordation in the office of the Secretary of 
Transportation. 
Id. at 409 (quoting the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U .S.C. § 1403 (1958». 
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empted, for there is a direct conflict between § 503(c) and such state 
laws, and the federal law must prevail."223 
The fact pattern seems strikingly similar to the CSA versus "medi-
cal" marijuana scenario: Illinois enacted a permissive aircraft transfer 
regime, and compliance with the State commercial transaction proce-
dures were inconsistent with the federal statutory mechanism for the 
exact same transaction.224 But much like the argument that mere exis-
tence of "medical" marijuana laws poses no conflict with the CSA un-
less, and until, a CSA-prohibited transaction actually occurs,225 if an 
aircraft owner never transfers a plane in a manner permitted by state 
law, i.e., absence of a memorializing document and failure to record 
the transfer instrument with the FAA, the owner is never placed in the 
position where his or her business transaction will of necessity be con-
ducted in a manner incompatible with federal statutory 
requirements.226 
Because the legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act evidenced 
Congressional intent that there be both documentation of all aircraft 
transfers and recordation of those documents,227 
Congress must have intended to preempt any state law under 
which a transfer without a recordable conveyance would be 
valid against innocent transferees or lienholders who have 
recorded .... Any other construction would defeat the pri-
mary congressional purpose for the enactment of § 503(c), 
which was to create 'a central clearing house for recordation 
of titles so that a person, wherever he may be, will know 
where he can find ready access to the claims against, or liens, 
or other legal interests in an aircraft. '228 
In much the same way, the purpose of the CSA, which included 
nationwide marijuana criminalization, was certainly not meant at the 
same time to permit or encourage the growing, cultivation, distribu-
tion, and use of marijuana within the fifty states at their discretion.229 
223. 
224. 
225. 
226. 
227. 
228. 
229. 
Id. at 4lO. 
See supra notes 211-22 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text. 
See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 410 (citing H.R. REp. No. 75-2254, at 9 (1938) 
and H.R. REp. No. 75-2635, at 74 (1938) (Conf. Rep.». 
Id. at 410-11 (quoting To Create A Civil Aeronautics Authority: Hearings on 
H.R 9738 Before the H. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th 
Congo 407 (1938) (testimony of Fred D. Fagg, Director of Air Commerce, 
Department of Commerce). 
The CSA's purpose, in pertinent part, was "designed to deal in a compre-
hensive fashion with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United 
States ... by providing for an overall balanced scheme of criminal penalties 
for offenses involving drugs." H.R. REp. No. 91-1444, at 1 (1970), reprinted 
in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 4566, 4567. In Campbell V. Hussey, it was argued that a 
Georgia tobacco classification regime merely supplemented and did not con-
flict with federal standards. 368 U.S. 297 (1961). Yet, the Court held that 
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That would definitely send mixed signals, a consequence that Con-
gress could not have wished. The Supreme Court specifically held in 
Philko "that state laws allowing undocumented or unrecorded transfers 
of interests in aircraft to affect innocent third parties are preempted 
by the federal Act."230 Similarly, the conclusion is inescapable that 
state "medical" marijuana laws are preempted by the CSA.231 
Another case of interest, Jones v. Hath Packing Co., involved differing 
state and federal food labeling laws.232 Joseph Jones, the Director of 
the Department of Weights and Measures in Riverside County, Cali-
fornia, ordered bacon packaged by Rath, and flour packaged by three 
different milling companies, "removed from sale" for failure to com-
ply with California weight measuring and labeling laws.233 The pack-
aging companies responded by successfully suing in the Central 
District of California seeking both an injunction against Jones, as well 
as a declaration that the California provisions were preempted by fed-
eral standards.234 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and so did the Su-
preme Court.235 
Importantly for our consideration, and after observing that "Con-
gressional enactments that do not exclude all state legislation in the 
same field nevertheless override state laws with which they conflict[,]" 
the Court reiterated the key standard used to determine whether pre-
emption exists in instances of overlapping jurisdiction. 236 The test, or 
standard, is whether '" [the State's] law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.' "237 Of significance to the consideration of the divergence 
between the CSA statutory purpose and the "medical" marijuana ini-
tiatives is the Court's additional remarks; specifically, that examina-
tion of the issue demands an understanding of how the two statutory 
"Congress, in legislating concerning the types of tobacco sold at auction, 
pre-empted the field and left no room for any supplementary state regula-
tion concerning those same types." Id. at 301. The Court asserted this be-
cause the purpose of the federal scheme was to establish a definite, 
uniform, and official U.S. classification and inspection standard. Id. The 
argument for preemption is, of course, even stronger when a state scheme 
is inconsistent with a federal standard that is designed to deal "in a compre-
hensive fashion" with an issue by creating "an overall balanced scheme." 
H.R. REp. No. 91-1444, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4567, 
4570. "The bill revises the entire structure of criminal penalties involving 
controlled drugs by providing a consistent method of treatment of all per-
sons accused of violations." Id. 
230. Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 412. 
231. See., e.g., Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 410; United States v. California, 332 
U.S. 19,36 (1947). 
232. 430 U.S. 519 (1977). 
233. Id. at 522. 
234. Id. at 523-24. 
235. Id. at 524. 
236. Id. at 525-26. 
237. Id. at 526 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
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schemes in fact interoperate (or do not), as opposed to how they may 
appear and be read in print.238 In particular, "[t]his inquiry requires 
us to consider the relationship between state and federal laws as they 
are interpreted and applied, not merely as they are written. "239 
Mter first concluding that the federal standards preempted the Cal-
ifornia labeling regime with respect to bacon packaging, the Supreme 
Court turned its attention to the federal and state approaches regard-
ing the marking of flour packaging.240 The Court determined that the 
applicable "federal weight-labeling standard for flour [was] the same 
as it [was] for meat."241 Next, the justices observed that "it would be 
possible to comply with the state law without triggering federal en-
forcement action, [the court] conclude[d] that the state requirement 
[was] not inconsistent with federallaw[,]" and therefore, the federal 
statute did not pre-empt California's.242 This strongly suggests that if 
it were not possible to comply with state law absent the "triggering of 
federal enforcement action," there would be inconsistency to the 
point that preemption would result.243 
That lack of inconsistency between the federal and state labeling 
requirements with respect to flour did not end matters for the Court, 
which went on to determine that a significant purpose of the federal 
statute was to "facilitate value comparisons among similar products," 
something not possible if the companies followed the California statu-
tory scheme.244 Adhering to state law in this instance "would prevent 
'the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress .... [,]'" an "impermissible" result requiring that 
"the state law must yield to the federal."245 The two sovereignties can-
238. Id. 
239. Id. (emphasis added). The Court's adjuration is particularly relevant in 
view of the argument that the CSA and "medical" marijuana initiatives do 
not evidence conflict unless, and until, someone affirmatively engages in an 
act which, although permitted by a State "medical" marijuana provision, is 
at the same time a violation of the CSA. See 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2001); See also 
supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. Conversely, it is claimed, absent 
such an act the two statutory schemes are not in "conflict." See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 903 (2001); See also supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
Admittedly, the facts before the Supreme Court in Jones established 
that the federal statute relating to bacon packaging prohibited labeling 
"'requirements in addition to, or different than, those made under'" the 
act. 430 U.S. at 530 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 678 (2000)). The Court con-
cluded that this was an "explicit pre-emption provision dictat[ing] the re-
sult in the [bacon labeling] controversy between Jones and Rath." [d. at 
530-31. 
240. Jones, 430 U.S. at 532. 
241. Id. at 533. 
242. Id. at 540. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 541. 
245. Id. at 543 (quoting, in part, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
See also Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) 
(federal regulations held to preempt state statute on same subject). 
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not operate in their own spheres while at the same time exercising 
their authority in conformity with the other.246 
The same logic compels the conclusion that adherence to state 
"medical" marijuana laws "would prevent 'the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress'" as set forth 
in the CSA,247 and that an action seeking a declaration that the CSA 
preempts such state laws would properly lie.248 
To reiterate, a state law is preempted by a federal statute or regula-
tion properly promulgated thereto, to the extent that the two con-
flict. 249 A conflict exists either when compliance with both the state 
and federal law is impossible250 or when the state law frustrates Con-
gressional intent, i.e., the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress."251 For our purposes, the CSA prohibits planting, cultivat-
ing, growing, harvesting, possessing, and distributing marijuana,252 
which, of necessity, is in "conflict" with state laws permitting such 
conduct.253 
Even where Congress has not completely displaced state regu-
lation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it 
actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when 
'compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical 
impossibility, or when state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.' 
246. Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 153 (citation omitted). This is so even if the matter is 
one that a state, for example, California, in addition to the federal govern-
ment, is seeking to regulate or control is a subject of particular importance 
or concern to the state and its people. See id. "The relative importance to 
the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid 
federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the federal 
law must prevail." [d. (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962». 
See also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. 
Comm., 461 U.S. 190,216 n.28 (1983) ("[Sltate law may not frustrate the 
operation of federal law simply because the state legislature in passing its 
law had some purpose in mind other than one of frustration.") (citing Pe-
rezv. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-52 (1971»). See also Fla. Lime & Avocado 
Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) ("The test of whether both fed-
eral and state regulations may operate, or the state regulation must give 
way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the 
federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar 
or different objectives." (citing H.R. REp. No. 74-1241, at 22-23 (1935) and 
S. REp. No. 74-1011, at 15 (1935»). 
247. jones,430 U.S. at 543 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67). 
248. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72,79 (1990) (citing Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. 
at 142-43). 
249. [d. at 79. 
250. [d. 
251. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 141 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 
67). 
252. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(15), (22), 841 (a)(l), 844 (2000). 
253. See English, 496 U.S. at 79. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The federal government is well-poised to argue in any forum that, 
1) the CSA trumps state laws which provide immunity from state civil 
and criminal prosecution to "medical" marijuana users and providers 
and, 2) that the federal government can enforce the CSA against state 
and local officials acting under a state/local "medical" marijuana law. 
